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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD L. SCOVILLE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14718 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 
35-4-IO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which affirmed the decision of 
an Appeal Referee denying unemployment benefits to Plaintiff for 52 weeks and assessing 
an overpayment for benefits received during the period of disqualification, on the grounds 
that when filing a claim for unemployment benefits for the week ended May 10, 1975, the 
Plaintiff knowingly failed to report material facts about work and earnings in order to 
receive unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled, in violation of Section 
35-4-S(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits effective the week Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ended May 10, 1975, for a period of 52 weeks, and was assessed an overpayment 01 
$1,292.00 for benefits received during the disqualification period by a determination of a 
Department Hearing Representative dated March 8, 1976. 
By decision dated April 29, 1976, an Appeal Referee affirmed the determination of the 
Hearings Representative. The decision of the Appeal Referee was affirmed by the Board of 
Review in a decision dated June 30, 1976, and amended that same date, in Case Number 
76-A-1002, 76-BR-89. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions of the Board of Review and the Commission. 
Defendant seeks affirmance of such decisions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant substantially agrees with the Statement of Facts set forth in Plaintiff's Brief, 
except in the following particulars: The Plaintiff filed claims for benefits for the weeks 
ended December 28, 1974, and January 4, 1975, reporting thereon work and earnings for 
each of those weeks. (R.0013, 0015, 0016, 0022, 0035.) The Plaintiff began work for Larsen 
Concrete and Asphalt Company on May 6, 1975, and earned $80.00 during the calendar 
week ended May 10, 1975. (R.0015, 0026, 0027, 0030, 0038.) He certified on his claim for 
the week ended May 10, 1975, that he had no work or earnings for that week (R.0015, 
0020), and on his claim for the week ended May 17, 1975, that he began work on May 12, 
1975. (R.0016, 0020, 0021). 
ARGUMENT 
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL 
REFEREE THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID KNOWINGLY WITHHOLD THE 
MATERIAL FACTS OF WORK AND EARNINGS TO OBTAIN UNEMPLOY-
MENT BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTITLED ARE NOT 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND ARE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act applicable herein are 35-4-5(e) 
and 35-4-6(d). 
Section 35-4-5(e) provides: 
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r 5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: (e) For the week with respect to which he had willfully made a false statement 
or re1:1resentation or k_n?wingly f~iled to report a material fact to obtain any 
benef1~ under the ?rov1s1ons of ~his act, and for the 51-week perior immediately 
followmg and until he has repaid to the fund all monies he received by reason 
of his fraud and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification 
period, provided that determinations under this subsection shall be made only 
upon a sworn written admission, or after due notice and recorded hearing; pro-
vided that when a claimant waives the recorded hearing a determination shall 
be made based upon all of the facts which the commission, exercising due 
diligence, has been able to obtain; and provided further that such determination 
shall be appealable in the manner provided by this act for appeals from other 
benefit determinations. 
Section 35-4-6(d) provides: 
Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as benefits under 
this act to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such sum to the 
commission for the fund. If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received 
any sum as benefits under this act to which under a redetermination or decision 
pursuant to this section he has been found not entitled, he shall be liable to 
repay such sum, and/or shall, in the discretion of the commission, be liable to 
have such sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him. In any case 
which under this subsection a claimant is liable to repay to the commission any 
sum for the fund, such sum shall be collectible in the same manner as provided 
for contributions due under this act. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established in Utah. 
Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides in part: 
In any judicial proceeding under this section the findings of the commission 
and the board of review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be con-
clusive and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Martinez v. Board 
of Review, 25 Vt. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Department 
denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the 
determination and the facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the 
Department's denial is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper 
Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 Ut. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 
987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Vt. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). In Members of Iron 
orkers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ut. 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208, 211, 
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If there is sub.stantial c<?mpetent .evidence to sustain the findings and decision 
of the Industn~l Commission, this C~urt may not set aside the decision even 
though on a review of the record we might well have reached a different result. 
There appears to be no dispute that Plaintiff did not report work and earnings for the 
week ended May 10, 1975, and that he reported on his claim for the next week that he had 
begun work on May 12, 1975. Plaintiff's principal contentions on appeal are (!) the 
evidence that Plaintiff actually worked during the week ended May 10, 1975, is 
inconclusive; (2) that Plaintiff was not sure he was under an obligation to report unpaid 
hours; and (3) that Plaintiff made an honest mistake in failing to report his work and 
earnings. 
The evidence to support the finding of the Appeal Referee that Plaintiff worked during 
the week ended May 10, 1975, is clear and ample. The employer, Larsen Concrete and 
Asphalt Company, responded to an inquiry from the Department of Employment Security 
dated December 8, 1975, reporting that Plaintiff had worked two hours on May 6, eight and 
one-half hours on May 8, and nine and one-half hours on May 9, and earned a total of 
$80.00 for those hours. (R.0038) On January 5, 1976, Plaintiff signed a statement that he 
disagreed with the employer's report and would check with the employer to see what his 
time card actually said. (R.0037) On January 12, 1976, Plaintiff reported that he had still 
not contacted his employer. (R.0037) 
At his hearing before the Appeal Referee the Plaintiff again disagreed with the 
employer's report. However, he testified that he had no reason to believe the report was not 
correct. 
Referee: Since this matter came to your attention, have you checked with the 
employer to see when you started work? 
Claimant: No. 
Referee: Do you have any reason to believe that report is incorrect? 
Claimant: No. (R.0019) 
After the hearing the Referee had the Department recontact the employer, who then 
furnished the Referee with copies of Plaintiff's W-4 form (R.0029), the employer's 
individual payroll record for the Plaintiff (R.0030), a check stub for the period ended May 
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8, 1975, indicating the emplqyee's name "Richard," (R.0026), and a canceled check dated 
May 9, 1975, which had been made out to and apparently endorsed by Plaintiff. (R.0027) It 
is difficult to perceive of what additional burden Plaintiff would place on the Commission 
to establish the fact of his employment during the week in question. Also, it should be noted 
that despite Plaintiff's objections to the employer's report, he did not at any time between 
January 5, 1976, and April 15, 1976, the date of the Appeal hearing, contact the employer 
to personally inspect the payroll records, nor did he offer to the Board of Review any 
evidence that the records were in error. 
The weekly claim card which all unemployment claimants are required to complete and 
submit contains spaces for a claimant to report the hours he worked each day, his gross 
earnings, the name of his employer, and the date he began steady work. Plaintiff cannot 
escape his responsibility to properly report such information by simply saying that his 
confusion regarding his work and payment schedule was not explained away in the hearings. 
The pertinent portions of the Plaintiff's testimony concerning this issue are contained in the 
following excerpts from the transcript: 
Referee: When you filed this claim for the week of May 10, 1975, were you 
aware that work and earnings should be reported on the weekly 
claims? 
Claimant: Yes. 
Referee: Were you aware they should be reported even though you hadn't 
yet been paid? 
Claimant: I wasn't sure on that 'cause I hadn't received no checks for nothing. 
Referee: Can you tell me why you failed to report your work and earnings 
there? The record would indicate that you apparently earned $80.00 
that week and yet no work or earnings had been reported. 
Claimant: I guess I just got the days mixed up-that's all I can figure-I got 
the dates mixed up between my boss and me. (R.0020) 
The weight to be given particular evidence is a matter within the province of the trier of 
the facts, taking into consideration all circumstances and surroundings that might in any 
way affect its credibility . 
. . . The weight to be given particular evidence is a matter l?eculiarly within !he 
province of the trier of the facts, unhampered by mechanical rules goverrung 
the weight or effect of evidence. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 394. 
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The Employment Security Act, Section 4, states that: "An unemployed individual 
shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found by 
the commission that: ... " thereby making the Commission the exclusive trier of the facts 
regarding all claims for unemployment compensation benefits. In the case of Walton v. 
Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App., 91 N.E. 2d 373 (1950), the court said: 
The duty to determine the facts has been delegated to the Board. A realistic 
interpretation of the facts and circumstances in evidence is absolutely essential 
to the successful operation of the plan. Of course, the Board may not disregard 
or refuse to consider uncontradicted testimony, but it is not always necessary 
in order for a conflict to exist, that testimony be directly contradicted or denied 
by other testimony. In its search for the truth the Board has the right to consider 
the interest of the witness; the probability or improbability of his assertions in 
the light of proved or admitted facts; the general situation as shown by all of the 
surrounding circumstances; the conditions or compulsions under which the 
witness acted and under which he testified; his prejudices, if any, and his desires; 
his apparent forthrightness or lack thereof; and many other factors. Haynes v. 
Brown, Ind. App. 1949, 88 N.E. 2d 795 .... 
In view of the employer's check dated May 9, 1975 (R.0027), the Referee found Plaintifrs 
testimony unconvincing and not credible. 
Plaintiff's assertion that he had made a simple and honest mistake is inconsistent with 
the evidence which was before the Referee and the Board of Review. Plaintiff's knowledge 
of the requirement to report all work and earnings is evidenced by both his testimony and 
his prior claims on which he correctly reported such information. The claimant's testimony 
that he was unsure how to report unpaid hours is curious in light of the employer's check 
issued on May 9, 1975, just two days before the claimant completed and signed the claim 
form. (R.0020) Finally, the claimant reported on his claim for the week ended May 17, 
1975, that he started work on May 12, 1975. (R.0020, 0021.) The Referee and Board of 
Review could reasonably conclude from such evidence that the claimant intentionally and 
knowingly withheld the information of his work and earnings for the purpose of obtaining 
benefits to which he was not entitled, in violation of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Employment 
Security Act. 
CONCLUSION j 
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by a claimant. Therefore, one claiming benefits under the unemployment insurance program 
has a duty to properly and accurately complete each weekly claim form, showing thereon all 
information material to that week's claim. To aid the claimant in completing his claim, the 
form sets forth the major areas of materiality, requiring the claimant to complete work and 
earnings information and to report the date he started back to steady work. 
In the instant case the Plaintiff left blank all portions of the claim dealing with work 
and earnings. Relying on that claim, the Department of Employment Security paid $76.00 
to the Plaintiff for a week in which the Plaintiff actually earned $80.00. In addition, the 
Plaintiff certified on his claim for the following week that he did not start work until May 
12, 1975. 
The evidence in this case is substantial and the decisions of the Appeal Referee and 
Board of Review should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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